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The present analysis is based on the insti-
tutional model of research on social proc-
esses. Thus, the idea of possible modernisa-
tion of Russian society rests on the considera-
tion of the current situation in the field of eco-
nomics, management, and science. On the ba-
sis of a secondary analysis of statistical data 
and the works of Russian and international 
sociologists, this article describes the funda-
mental conceptual framework of the moderni-
sation of Russian society. In particular, it fo-
cuses on the criticism of the modernisation 
project initiated by the forces that present 
themselves as conservative. The author also 
mentions significant problems arising during 
the modernisation of Russian society; these 
problems are rooted in both objective condi-
tions of the on-going process and subjective 
factors. The article addresses the emergence 
and development of the modernisation idea in 
Russia. The relevance of this work lies in the 
identification of the features of the transition 
of Russian society into a new phase, which 
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An innovative approach to the further 
development of Russian society persis-
tently and consistently propagandised by 
the country’s top political leaders over the 
last decade reflects, in its essence, the 
fundamental needs of a transitory society 
rather than a partial desire or someone’s 
propensity to use popular categories. The 
point is that, to a great degree, the nega-
tive social, economic, and other process 
that took place in the society in the late 
1980s-1990s, as the statistical data, expert 
evaluations, and surveys show, stretch to 
the 2000s and 2010s. These processes 
leave little room for manoeuvring the ad-
ministration system so that the country 
reclaims the position of an industrial and 
scientific power. Apparently, all of that 
complicates the problem of modernisa-
tion. 
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However, before focusing on the history of the idea of modernising Rus-
sian society, before designing possible mechanisms and social technologies 
of bringing Russia onto the path of sustainable development according to the 
post-industrial scenario, and identifying possible threats and risks, it seems 
reasonable to pay attention to the actual economic situation, especially that 
in the field of investment. 
As a result of a steep decline in the manageability of all spheres of activ-
ity at the end of the 1980s and in the course of the so called reforms of the 
1990s, Russian economy went through an unprecedented downturn for 
peacetime. On a conservative estimate, by 1998 (the lowest level since 
1990), GDP decreased by more than 40 % and industrial production by more 
than 50 %. The worst situation was observed in investment dynamics. The 
amount of investment in fixed capital had reduced almost fivefold by 1998 
(21 % of the 1989 level). Even in pre-crisis 2008, after apparently successful 
years, its amount reached only 60 % of the hardly prosperous 1989. Despite 
the fact that, in 2007, real GDP rose for the first time above the level of 1990 
in terms of volume, such restoration did not take place in industrial produc-
tion. Moreover, a number of industrial nomenclature positions continued to 
decline in the prosperous 2000s [1, с. 34]. It is a well-known fact that in the 
mid-1980s, the USSR national income accounted for 66 % of that of the 
USA, whereas industrial manufacturing accounted for 80 % [2, с. 13]. If, 
back then, labour efficiency in manufacturing accounted for 55 % of that in 
the USA [2, с. 13], in the late 1990s, this indicators amounted to mere 20—
24 % [3]. In the late 1990s, Russia was assuming the features of a poorly de-
veloped country reproducing early industrial or even archaic forms of social 
and economic life: export of unprocessed raw materials, artisanal handicraft, 
cabbing, and small retail trade. If the share of the USSR in world GDP 
amounted to 4 % and ranked 6th in the world, then in 1995 Russia accounted 
for 2 % and was ranked 11th. By the end of the 1990s, in term of this indica-
tor, Russia lost more than 10 positions [4, с. 26]. 
Post-reform Russia almost ceased exporting industrial products and ex-
ported only raw materials and products of their primary processing. In 1985, 
20 % of the manufactured motor cars were exported, as well as 28.2 % of 
watches and clocks, 38.4 % of cameras, and only 5 % of coal. 5.55 % of 
round wood, 10.7 % of gas, and 19.7 % of oil. In 2009, finished goods ac-
counted for only 4.7 % of export into non-CIS countries, whereas round 
wood, gas, and coal for 23.8, 28.8, and 66.4 % respectively [1, с. 34]. The 
World Bank data show that in 2001 oil and gas accounted for less than a half 
of Russian export. In 2010, they accounted for two thirds and other fossil fu-
els for 15 %. The share of hi-tech products — predominantly weaponry and 
other military equipment — was only 9 % [5]. 
Now let us examine the technological development of production and the 
level of research, first of all, applied research. According to the Ifo Institute 
for Economic Research (Germany), whose data were used, for instance, by 
academician N. Ya. Petrakov, in Russia in the late 1990s, 40 % of equipment 
was completely (!) worn out [6]. The share of equipment operating for up to 
5 years decreased, according to the official statistics, from 29 % in 1990 to 
4.5 % in 1998 [3]. There is enough evidence to say that the extraordinary 
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openness of the domestic Russian market to the products of IBM and other 
similar companies completely destroyed the national electronics industry. 
A similar situation has been faced by other industries and branches that 
determine the level of technological progress — those engaged in innovative 
activity and IT development. Investment in basic and applied science and 
R&D is at the level which is insufficient to ensure even simple reproduction 
of scientific schools, individual lines of research, staff training, implementa-
tion of target programmes and large research projects, etc. i. e. is not suffi-
cient to promote continuity of scientific tradition, evolutionary change of 
generations of scholars and constructors. 
As many specialists believe, the experience of developed countries 
shows that the share of GDP allocated for research cannot be lower than 
2 %. If it decreases to 1.5 %, it is indicative of a slow decline of fundamental 
research, i. e. the basics of science in general and the system of research staff 
reproduction in particular. In Israel, this indicator reached 2.5 % in the mid-
1990s, in Japan 3.05 %, in the USA 2.74 %, in Russia 0.32 % [7, с.178]. It is 
not a coincidence that, on the market of civil hi-tech goods, the share of Rus-
sian products is less than 1 %, whereas that of the USA is 36 %, and that of 
Japan 30 % [3]. 
However, today the country’s leadership aims to support research and 
science in general. In accordance with the presidential decree “On the meas-
ures of implementing public policy in the field of education and science”, the 
government has to “ensure the achievement of the following indicators in the 
field of science: an increase in the total financing of public research founda-
tions to 25 bln roubles until 2018; an increase in national expenditure on 
R&D — to 1.77 % of GDP until 2015, 11.4 % of which are to be spent on 
higher education institutions” [8]. In comparison to the 1990s, there is an 
evident attempt to increase the share of GDP allocated to science. At the 
same time, such growth will not help fundamental and applied research to 
rise above the level of survival and secure reproduction of highly qualified 
research staff. 
Now let us address the problem of human capital, whose development 
ensures the success of the modernisation project. Russia ranks 66th in the 
Human Development Index published by the UN. In a year, the country, 
which ranked 65th in 2010, lost one position; however, the absolute value in-
creased from 0.719 to 0.755. In 2011, Russia ranked between Belarus and 
Grenada. Such countries as Libya and Cuba occupied higher positions. As 
well as two years before, Norway ranked first. The lowest position was oc-
cupied by the Democratic Republic of Congo. All in all, the index included 
187 countries in comparison to 169 a year earlier. HDI also takes into ac-
count such indicators as life expectancy, education index, and GDP per cap-
ita. Since 1990, it is published by the UN together with the Human Devel-
opment Report. The 2011 report places emphasis on the fact that an increase 
in the index is often accompanied by environmental problems. It also shows 
that the extension of rights and opportunities contributes to a higher standard 
of living. Moreover, the report shows the interconnection between sustain-
able development and equal opportunities [9]. 
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The early 2000s gave rise not only to the expectations of a considerable 
economic growth, but also a seemingly tangible opportunity to overcome the 
negative effects of the 1998 financial crisis. So, in 200—2003, the average 
GDP growth amounted to 6 %, whereas the rate of saving increased from 16 
to almost 20 %. According to the Federal State Statistics Service, in 2003, 
the rate of actual GDP growth amounted to 7.3 %, which took place against 
the background of stagnation of the world leading economies — the conse-
quences of the crisis are still visible in Japan and the EU countries. The main 
driving forces of the recent Russian upturn are evident: a massive devalua-
tion of the rouble as a result of the financial crisis; the availability of 
unloaded capacities as a result of the preceding long-term crisis; high oil 
prices [10]. It is not a coincidence that during that period, President 
V. V. Putin formulated an ambitious task in his annual address to the Federal 
Assembly: “Over the next decade, we must at least double our country’s 
gross domestic product” [11]. However, President D. A. Medvedev, in his 
address of 2009, emphasised that “… in the twenty-first century, our country 
once again needs to undergo comprehensive modernisation. This will be our 
first ever experience of modernisation based on democratic values and insti-
tutions. Instead of a primitive raw materials economy, we will create a new 
smart economy producing unique knowledge, new goods and technology for 
people” [12]. 
The statement about the need for modernisation made in the address rests 
on a more comprehensive review of the problem given in D. A. Medvedev’s 
article “Go, Russia!” It describes the main lines of modernisation, in particu-
lar, those in the economic sphere. Firstly, Russia must become one of the 
leading countries in production efficiency, energy transportation and use, 
which requires the development and introduction of new types of fuel into 
domestic and foreign markets. Secondly, there is a need to maintain and im-
prove nuclear technologies. Thirdly, Russian specialists have to further de-
velop information technologies, gain influence on global information net-
work development by using supercomputers and other infrastructure ele-
ments. Fourthly, the country must develop its own ground- and space-based 
infrastructure for data transfer, so that Russian satellites “see” the whole 
world helping Russian citizens, as well as people all over the world commu-
nicate, travel, do research and engage in agricultural and industrial produc-
tion. Fifthly, Russia has to become a leader in the manufacturing of certain 
types of medical equipment, modern diagnostics devices, and design medica-
tions for treating viral, cardiovascular, oncological, and neurological dis-
eases [13]. One cannot but notice that, on the one hand, the objective of GDP 
doubling corresponds to the modernisation objective, but, on the other hand, 
seems to be rather autonomous, since it cannot be reduced to quantitative 
growth parameters and is associated with the qualitative component. 
If one addresses the historical aspect, it becomes evident that Russian 
society underwent a long-term and rather successful phase of the so called 
Soviet modernisation in the 20th century. The classical interpretation defined 
modernisation as a process taking place simultaneously with industrialisa-
tion, where the decisive factor is the replacement of traditional values that 
hinder social changes and economic growth with the values that motivate 
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business entities for innovative activity, i. e. the development and dissemina-
tion of new technologies and generation of new organisational and economic 
relations. Modernisation was understood as the process of modernity sup-
plant the tradition or as the ascending development from the tradition society 
to the modern one. At the same time, the tradition was believed to hamper 
social progress, thus, it was to be overcome and eliminated. The develop-
ment of all countries and nations was considered from the universalistic per-
spective — it had to have the same direction, stages, and patterns. Certain 
national features of modernisation were recognised by considered to be of 
minor importance [14, с. 233—247]. 
The Soviet modernisation did indeed change the country, having trans-
formed it from a mainly agrarian into an industrial state, which was inevita-
bly accompanied by changes in the social structure of society, the emergence 
of a large group of engineers and technical specialists, the elimination of il-
literacy of the majority of population, and the levelling of existing disparities 
in the sociocultural development of many regions of the country. Over a 
short period, not only whole industrial branches were created from a scratch, 
but there also emerged an independent foundation for basic and applied re-
search. In the late Soviet period (1985—1990), the ideas of acceleration and 
perestroika were, perhaps, an ill-formulated idea of a need for new moderni-
sation. Evidently, today one can speak of a transition to post-industrial soci-
ety, which can underlie neomodernisation. 
But this idea — the idea of modernisation of modern Russian society — 
is strongly criticised by different parties and from different angels. Often 
such criticism is of conceptual, theoretical nature. So, A. G. Dugin, in his re-
port “The critique of the modernisation concept. A conservative response on 
the basis of the fourth political theory”, emphasises that “there is develop-
ment, but there is also decline. Those who rely solely on growth and devel-
opment contradict the rules of sociological laws. Such modernisation, such 
growth, such development, such progress are impossible” [15]. Thus it con-
cerns not only modernisation, but rather a more gradual evolutionary process 
based, in particular, on some traditional values and rules. One should keep in 
mind that such transformation is a rather long processes consisting of several 
phases. For example, Piotr Sztompka believes that the path of modernisation 
transformations consists of consecutive stages, for instance, “traditional-
transitional-modern”, “traditional — achievement of preliminary conditions 
for changes —beginning of continued growth — maturing — achievement 
of the mass consumption level” [16, с. 172]. Hence the question about to 
what extent the society has reached the stage of maturing, including its men-
tal elements, i. e. the readiness of mass consciousness to not only accept, but 
also support such transformations. 
In this context, it becomes obvious that, since the end of 1991, the re-
form process has encountered a standard set of system-development prob-
lems and crises, which must be resolved (or overcome) in a certain admissi-
ble way, if our state system claims the status of a “modern” one in accor-
dance with the criteria of “differentiation”, “equality”, “viability”, “democ-
racy”, etc. 
According to J. Coleman’s classification, the path of modernisation is 
fraught with the problems of “national identity”; “political legitimation” of 
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the modernising elite; “penetration”, i. e. the establishment of institution in 
line with the “modern” demands of “masses” “integration”, i. e. imparting 
the qualities ensuring the achievement of socially significant objectives ad 
“distribution”, i. e. “the effective use of government power to bring about 
economic growth, mobilize resources, and distribute goods, services, and 
values in response to mass demands and expectations”, to the political proc-
ess [17, p. 400]. 
It seems that today the most threatening phenomenon is the crisis of par-
ticipation, which — as well as all others — exhibit specific features in Russia. 
Not only the unreadiness to create institutions of inclusion of masses into so-
cial, political, and other processes, but rather the internal unreadiness for such 
inclusion acts as a blocking element of modernisation. 
As to the prospects of a successful modernisation in Russia, M. Gorshkov, 
the director of the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 
detected a negative trend on the basis of the data of numerous surveys. The 
trend consists in that “even within the youngest groups (under 26 years old); 
the dominating sentiment is that an independent choice of one’s fate is impos-
sible. And it is the youth of the modern world, of today’s Russia! Only, within 
senior age groups, the role of one’s independent choice becomes dominating: a 
person comes to a conclusion that their voice has to be heard and is ready to be 
the architect of one’s fate. In my opinion, the pyramid should be overturned — 
from the perspective of the civilized world. It should not be like that in modern 
Russia either, otherwise, no reforms will help us implement modernisation in 
our country” [18]. 
The above suggests that the modernisation of modern Russia can mean, 
first of all, a reversal of archaisation of relations and interactions, which resur-
faced in the 1990s. In other words, it means that a certain civilizational throw-
back characteristic of Russia in the 1990s, should be not only overcome, but 
also levelled at an advanced rate. Secondly, this process can be carried out on 
the basis of wide introduction of such civil society institutions that would not 
be a simulation of the democratic process but would indeed ensure the inclu-
sion of the most active social layers into the modernisation of Russian society. 
Thirdly, the modernisation of modern Russia contains the possibility of mini-
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